Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place by Pfaff, John F.
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 45
Number 2 The Geography of Confinement Article 6
2018
Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place
John F. Pfaff
Fordham University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
John F. Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 Fordham Urb. L.J. 571 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol45/iss2/6
  571
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE POLITICS 
OF PLACE 
John F. Pfaff* 
 
Introduction ............................................................................................. 571 
  I.  County Prosecutors, City Crime ..................................................... 574 
  II.  Prisons and the Census ................................................................... 585 
Conclusion ................................................................................................ 592 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As a general matter, our criminal justice system focuses on the 
person: who committed the crime and what punishment does that 
person deserve?  Most of the reforms that have been proposed or 
passed over the past nine or ten years have primarily focused on the 
who as well, seeking to change the rules under which parole boards 
operate, or the ways in which we train or oversee police officers, or 
how we address implicit racial biases in judges.1 
Yet where plays a significant role in crime and punishment as well.  
In fact, in the end, where likely matters more than who.  For instance, 
crime is densely concentrated.  Most reported crimes in any city take 
place in only a small fraction of city blocks, with neighborhoods often 
maintaining their high- or low-crime status even as the population 
within these neighborhoods changes.2  As one scholar points out, it is 
easier to predict where a crime will happen in a city than who in that 
                                                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Thank you to Larry 
Abraham for his help on this Essay. 
 1. See, e.g., Destiny Peery, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help, but It’s 
Not Enough, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:29 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/destiny-peery/implicit-bias-training-fo_b_9464
564.html [https://perma.cc/V8NQ-NXZ9]. 
 2. See generally, e.g., David Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, 9 IDEAS IN AM. 
POLICING 1 (2008) [hereinafter Weisburd, Place-Based Policing]; David Weisburd et 
al., Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments in the 
City of Seattle, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 283 (2004). 
572 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
city will commit it.3  Furthermore, racial disparities in offending are 
the product of place, produced in no small part by how government 
policies have shaped where people live.  Decades of government 
policies, such as explicitly segregating public housing,4 explicitly and 
implicitly tolerating or encouraging redlining,5 and denying the GI 
Bill6 and FHA mortgages (and thus the ability to invest in higher-
quality housing) to Black Americans,7 all worked to concentrate 
disadvantage and social instability in poor, predominantly minority 
neighborhoods.8  The cumulative effects of these policies are still felt 
today.9 
If the story of crime is largely one of place, then the story of 
punishment is as well.  A significant share of crimes occurs in 
proximity to where those who commit them live, so the geographic 
concentration of crime concentrates punishment as well.  Some 
studies talk of “million dollar blocks,” which are single city blocks 
that have so many residents behind bars that at any given time the 
state is allegedly spending at least $1 million per year to incarcerate 
these people.10  As a result, the costs (as well as the benefits) of 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, supra note 2.  
 4. See J.A. Stoloff, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Office of Policy Dev. & 
Research, A Brief History of Public Housing 6 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with the Fordham Urban Law Journal) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 ended segregation of public spaces, including public housing). 
 5. See FED. RESERVE, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK, FEDERAL FAIR 
LENDING REGULATIONS AND STATUTES: FAIR HOUSING ACT (Jan. 2006), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TAB-BTSF] (“The term refers to the presumed practice of 
mortgage lenders of drawing red lines around portions of a map to indicate areas or 
neighborhoods in which they do not want to make loans.”). 
 6. See IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN 
UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 113, 
123–28 (2005). 
 7. See Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, 
and Segregated Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, 7 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 21, 
25 (2015). 
 8. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN 
HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). 
 9. See John Eligon & Robert Gebeloff, Affluent and Black, and Still Trapped by 
Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21/us/
milwaukee-segregation-wealthy-black-families.html [https://nyti.ms/2k2FCNb]. 
 10. See, e.g., ‘Million-Dollar Blocks’ Map Incarceration’s Costs, NPR: ALL 
THINGS CONSIDERED (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/02/162149431/
million-dollar-blocks-map-incarcerations-costs [https://perma.cc/Z4KD-TNMM].  I 
say “allegedly” because the dollar value is computed by multiplying the average 
annual cost of locking someone up in prison by the number of people from that block 
locked up that year.  But a large fraction of state prison costs is fixed, with nearly 
two-thirds of spending going to wages and other benefits for correctional officers and 
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punishment have an impact on place that extends beyond the 
individuals incarcerated.  A simple but striking example: in one study 
of a high-incarceration neighborhood in Washington, D.C., scholar 
Donald Braman reported that so many men were behind bars that it 
disrupted family formation in that area.11  Healthy family formation 
requires a male-female ratio of approximately 50-50, but in some 
areas, that ratio fell to about 60 men for every 100 women.12  Since 
most people form relationships with those they live close to, this is a 
clear geographic cost of punishment. 
This Essay explores another connection between punishment and 
place: how geography shapes the politics of punishment.  To 
understand why actors in the criminal justice system act the way they 
do, it is essential to understand their incentives, and that requires us 
to carefully examine not just who these people are but where they 
are.  What are the boundaries that define the constituents to whom 
these actors respond and thus their incentives and goals? 
When we take a closer look at the geography of criminal justice, we 
soon see that what we call the “criminal justice system” is not in any 
way a system.  It is, at best, a web of systems (plural), each of which 
faces different pressures and politics due in part to different 
geographies.  Police are generally city employees who respond to a 
police chief who is appointed by a city-elected mayor.  Prosecutors 
are almost always elected by county electorates, parole boards are 
appointed by state-elected governors, and sentencing laws are written 
by legislators who are nominally state officials but respond to 
constituencies that could span several towns (in rural areas) or barely 
                                                                                                                                         
other staff. See CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
PRICE OF PRISONS: EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 9 (2017), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/price-of-
prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/legacy_downloads/the-price-of-prisons-2015-
state-spending-trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RVW-4YE5].  As a result, the marginal 
cost of locking up one more person is quite less than the average, often on the order 
of one-third to one-seventh as large. See John Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER 
(Mar. 21, 2016, 6:30 AM), https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/711907958368694272 
[https://perma.cc/28F4-JALX]. 
 11. See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: 
INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2003). 
 12. Focusing on the male-female ratio is not meant to dismiss same-sex couples or 
the impact that incarceration can have on same-sex couple family formation.  
According to the Census, however, only about one percent of all couples identified as 
same-sex in 2015, so the primary impact of incarceration on family formation has 
been felt by heterosexual couples. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHARACTERISTICS OF 
SAME-SEX COUPLE HOUSEHOLDS, 2015 DATA TABLE, https://www.census.gov/
data/tables/time-series/demo/same-sex-couples/ssc-house-characteristics.html 
[https://perma.cc/4DHZ-43G8].  
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one neighborhood (in dense cities).13  Judges can be state or county 
officials, who are either elected or appointed, depending on the 
state.14  Neighborhoods have different goals than their cities, cities 
than the counties in which they are located, and counties than the 
states they make up. 
Sometimes the jurisdictional lines we draw may make sense, but 
quite often they appear to be haphazard, if not completely arbitrary.  
Why, for instance, do we choose prosecutors along county lines?  As 
we will see, many actors in the criminal justice system face troubling 
or perverse incentives, in no small part because of the constituents to 
whom they respond (or the people to whom they don’t respond).15 
To examine the role of place in the politics of punishment, this 
Essay considers two examples: (1) the decision to elect prosecutors at 
the county level, and (2) the impact of locating prisons in rural 
communities.  Both push us towards greater punitiveness and away 
from often-sensible reforms in subtle but important ways that have 
started to garner attention among scholars and activists but are still 
under-appreciated.  One weakness of current reform efforts is that 
they rarely target these underlying geographic (and other structural) 
issues that led to mass incarceration in the first place.  Many of the 
same pressures that caused us to over-react to rising crime in the 
1970s and 1980s and under-react to falling crime since the 1990s 
remain; unless reforms confront these structural issues, it may not 
take much of a rise in crime to see many reforms undone. 
I.  COUNTY PROSECUTORS, CITY CRIME 
Perhaps the single most important actor in the criminal justice 
system today is the prosecutor.16  Unfortunately, there is a geographic 
disconnect that distorts the incentives many of them face in deeply 
problematic ways.  As a general matter, prosecutors are elected by 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. See Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 
1528, 1530 (2012). 
 14. See, e.g., Methods of Judicial Selection: Selection of Judges, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_
of_judges.cfm?state [https://perma.cc/2MPS-2QRF]. 
 15. See generally JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017). 
 16. See generally id.; John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison 
Growth, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1237 (2012) [hereinafter Pfaff, The Micro and Macro 
Causes of Prison Growth]. See also German Lopez, If You Care About Ending Mass 
Incarceration, Look at What Philadelphia Just Did, VOX (Nov. 8, 2017, 10:30 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/11/8/16622438/larry-krasner-
philadelphia-election-prosecutor [https://perma.cc/57G2-5XYE]. 
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county electorates, but the communities with the most voting power 
are rarely those whose members are most likely to face prosecution.17  
As we will see, this separates the costs and benefits of aggressive 
enforcement in ways that can lead prosecutors to both under-enforce 
and over-enforce criminal laws. 
It is hard to understate the power of prosecutors.  Granted nearly-
unfettered and nearly-unreviewable discretion, prosecutors determine 
almost every aspect of a defendant’s case: they decide whether to 
press charges or drop the case, whether to divert the case to some sort 
of alternative court or push through for a conviction, whether to 
charge the defendant with a felony or a misdemeanor, whether to file 
a charge that carries a mandatory minimum sentence, whether to seek 
jail or prison time as part of the plea bargaining process, and so on.18  
Moreover, prosecutors’ offices are better funded and staffed than 
government-provided counsel who represent the 80% of defendants 
who face prison or jail time and qualify as indigent.  This funding 
disparity further increases prosecutors’ advantage.19 
As a result, prosecutors played a central role in pushing up prison 
admissions and populations, especially over the course of the 1990s 
and 2000s, as the crime rate fell steadily and the rate of serious crime 
fell steeply.20  Between 1994 and 2008, total arrests fell by about 10% 
while the number of felony cases filed in state court rose by around 
40%; fewer people were entering the system, but more people were 
entering prison.21  That increase in filings, a decision wholly within 
the purview of the prosecutor, drove prison growth; the other two 
plausible sources of prison growth, namely the probability that a 
felony case resulted in an admission to prison and the time spent in 
prison if admitted, both remained stable over this time.22  At least 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 7. 
 18. See John F. Pfaff, Prosecutorial Guidelines, in 3 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 101, 104 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
 19. See id. at 106. 
 20. For more detail, see generally Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison 
Growth, supra note 16. 
 21. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 72.  The dates reflect the years for which data was 
available. 
 22. Even if we accept the findings by the Pew Charitable Trusts—that time served 
between 1990 and 2009 for property and drug crimes rose by about six months, and 
for violent crimes by less than 1.5 years—those increases are still not enough to 
explain all that much of the rise in prison populations over the 1990s and 2000s. See 
PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, TIME SERVED: THE HIGH COST, 
LOW RETURN OF LONGER PRISON TERMS 3 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/
assets/2012/06/06/time_served_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/88K8-R5JH]; PFAFF, supra 
note 15, at 58–59. 
576 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
during the period of crime decline, rising incarceration rates were 
propelled most significantly by prosecutorial charging decisions.23 
Prosecutors have also driven prison growth in other less 
immediately-obvious but no less important ways.  For example, some 
critics of the view that prosecutors are central to prison growth have 
argued that legislatures and the judiciary bear a big part of the blame 
instead, but this claim ignores the fact that district attorneys shape 
these institutions as well.24  District Attorney associations are 
effective advocates for harsh new laws and are generally against 
efforts at reform.25  And many judges are former prosecutors—far 
more than are former defense attorneys—who likely bring with them 
a prosecutorial mindset, even if just subconsciously.26 
By almost all accounts, their aggressive emphasis on incarceration 
was unnecessary, if not actually counterproductive.27  And, as we will 
see, geography played an important role in driving this prosecutorial 
overreach.  But first, it is also useful to look at a far less appreciated 
story of problematic prosecutorial leniency that further highlights the 
importance of place.  As William Stuntz points out, over the 1960s, as 
                                                                                                                                         
 23. See Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, supra note 16, at 
1252. 
 24. See Jeffrey Bellin, The Limits of Prosecutorial Power, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (May 2, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/05/02/
the-limits-of-prosecutorial-power [https://perma.cc/G9VZ-KU64]. 
 25. The California Correctional Peace Officers Association has been particularly 
effective at arguing for and defending tough-on-crime policies; recent reform efforts 
in Louisiana, while admirable, were weakened almost solely due to prosecutorial 
concerns; reform efforts in Wyoming, on the verge of success, were scuttled when a 
leading prosecutor weighed in in opposition; and so on. See, e.g., Andrew Graham, 
Who Killed Criminal Justice Reform?, WYOFILE (Sept. 26, 2017), 
http://www.wyofile.com/killed-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/M5HG-93V9]; 
Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice 
Reform, THE NATION (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/prosecutors-
are-banding-together-to-prevent-criminal-justice-reform/ [https://perma.cc/B8CH-
B3XR]. 
 26. See, e.g., Casey Tolan, Why Public Defenders Are Less Likely to Become 
Judges—And Why That Matters, SPLINTER NEWS (Mar. 18, 2016, 2:43 PM), 
https://splinternews.com/why-public-defenders-are-less-likely-to-become-judges-a-
1793855687 [https://perma.cc/FG35-2NWQ]. 
 27. See, e.g., DAVID ROODMAN, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT, THE IMPACTS OF 
INCARCERATION ON CRIME 7 (2017), http://files.openphilanthropy.org/files/Focus_
Areas/Criminal_Justice_Reform/The_impacts_of_incarceration_on_crime_10.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9SAY-ZR89]; Rucker Johnson & Steven Raphael, How Much 
Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?, 55 J.L. & ECON. 275, 277 (2012); 
Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Market Impacts of Incarceration, at 3 
(Aug. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Michigan, 
Department of Economics), https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wp-content/uploads/
sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFP6-CYB9]. 
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crime appeared to start rising sharply,28 incarceration stayed flat, and 
at times declined.29  Figure 1, which plots the incarceration rate not in 
terms of per 100,000 people (as it usually is shown) but in terms of per 
1000 reported violent and property crimes, illustrates this clearly.  
Prosecutors (as well as police and other law enforcement officials) 
appear to have under-responded to rising crime in the 1960s and 
1970s just as much as they over-responded to falling crime in the 
1990s and 2000s. 
 
Figure 1. “Effective” Incarceration Rate30 
                                                                                                                                         
 28. I say “appeared” because there is an intriguing discrepancy in our crime 
statistics.  Over the 1970s and 1980s, serious violent crime rose according to the 
Uniform Crime Reports (“UCR”), but generally fell according to the National Crime 
Victimization Survey (“NCVS”).  The two studies measure crime in very different 
ways—the UCR measures crimes reported to local police departments, while the 
NCVS surveys thousands of people nationwide about their victimization 
experiences—but are trying to describe the same outcome.  Some have argued that 
the NCVS was a better measure in the 1960s and 1970s, but the explanations often 
turn on hard-to-validate and highly contestable assumptions. See, e.g., Janet L. 
Lauritsen et al., When Choice of Data Matters: Analyses of U.S. Crime Trends, 
1973–2012, 32 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 335, 336 (2016). 
 29. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 28 
(2011). 
 30. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
TOOL, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=daa [https://perma.cc/PMG7-FREK] (data 
on file with author). 
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Both of these mis-reactions are troubling.  The over-reaction in the 
1990s and 2000s sent thousands of people to prison with little benefit 
to public safety—and might have even made things worse.31  And the 
under-reaction in the 1960s and 1970s not only led to excessive 
victimization, especially among poorer and more-minority 
populations, but it also surely contributed to the tough-on-crime 
backlash against seemingly-weak criminal justice policies that helped 
drive punitive practices in the 1980s and well into the years after.32 
Geography helps us understand both of these mis-reactions, 
because both are tied to how prosecutors are elected.  The United 
States is the only country in the world that elects its prosecutors, and 
in forty-seven states these prosecutors are elected at either the county 
or (in a few states) the cluster-of-a-few-counties level.33  The decision 
to elect at the county level may seem to be an innocuous decision 
about voting district size, but it is one that has likely played a major 
role in driving, or at least sustaining, punitive practices in the United 
States. 
The problem with electing prosecutors at the county level arises 
from the geographic concentration of crime.  To start, crime is much 
more frequent in cities than in suburbs.  A Brookings Institute study, 
for example, reported that in 2008, cities had a violent crime rate of 
2129 per 100,000 people, compared to a rate half that, or 1062 per 
100,000 people, in those cities’ suburbs; for murder, the most high-
profile crime, the relative gap was even larger, at 12 per 100,000 
people for cities and 3 per 100,000 people for suburbs.34  Even within 
cities, crime is often highly localized, with some studies reporting that 
half of all reported crime occurs in fewer than 10% of all city blocks, 
and almost all reported crime in at most half.35  For instance, in 2015, 
nearly half the increase in murders in Chicago took place in just five 
                                                                                                                                         
 31. Whatever impact prison had on crime in the past, as it stands now, it is likely 
that the marginal contribution of an inmate is close to zero, if not zero or negative. 
See Johnson & Raphael, supra note 27, at 275–310; Mueller-Smith, supra note 27. 
 32. See STUNTZ, supra note 29, at 251–52. 
 33. Ellis, supra note 13, at 1530.  The only states that do not elect prosecutors at 
the county level are Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey. George Coppolo, States 
That Elect Their Chief Prosecutors, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Feb. 24, 2003), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/rpt/2003-R-0231.htm [https://perma.cc/G4CA-9MNX]. 
 34. Elizabeth Kneebone & Steven Raphael, City and Suburban Crime Trends in 
Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS INST. (May 2011), https://gspp.berkeley.edu/
assets/uploads/research/pdf/p66.pdf [https://perma.cc/MR5L-GZRQ]. 
 35. Weisburd, Place-Based Policing, supra note 2, at 5. 
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neighborhoods, which were home to under 10% of the city’s 
population.36 
As a result of this concentration of crime, the costs (as well as the 
benefits) of enforcement are also concentrated.  Crime imposes 
serious costs,37 but so too does enforcement.  We often focus on the 
fiscal costs of enforcement—the approximately $100 billion spent on 
policing, the approximately $50 billion spent on state prisons, and the 
approximately $30 billion spent on county jails—but there are far 
more costs that come from exposure to prison and punishment.38  
Prison is a serious vector of sexually transmitted diseases and diseases 
like tuberculosis; a study in New York suggested that in the short run, 
each year spent in prison shortens life expectancy by two years; the 
risk of death from a drug overdose rises precipitously upon release 
from prison.39  Prison disrupts existing families, and it impedes 
marriage and family formation.40  It leads to significant declines in 
already-low incomes for those who go to prison, and it imposes often-
exorbitant costs on incarcerated persons’ families (such as collect calls 
that have been known to cost more than $1 per minute).41  No one 
                                                                                                                                         
 36. MAX KAPUSTIN ET AL., UNIV. CHI. CRIME LAB, GUN VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO, 
2016, at 17 (2017), https://urbanlabs.uchicago.edu/attachments/store/2435a5d4658e2ca
19f4f225b810ce0dbdb9231cbdb8d702e784087469ee3/UChicagoCrimeLab+Gun+Viole
nce+in+Chicago+2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY4Y-3GJW].  Those five neighborhoods 
ended up explaining 10% of the national increase in homicides between 2015 and 
2016. John F. Pfaff (@JohnFPfaff), TWITTER (Sept. 25, 2017, 6:13 AM), 
https://twitter.com/JohnFPfaff/status/912304075961708544 [https://perma.cc/2SNZ-
2JSX]. 
 37. A tool developed by RAND Corporation suggests that the total cost of 
reported serious crime in 2016 was on the order of $324 billion dollars, with almost 
$150 billion just from homicide. Cost of Crime Calculator, RAND CORP. (using 2016 
Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/
crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/table-1 [https://perma.cc/36ZW-26NS]), 
https://www.rand.org/jie/justice-policy/centers/quality-policing/cost-of-crime.html 
[https://perma.cc/RVG8-WVZR].  However, more than half of all violent crimes and 
nearly two-thirds of all property crimes go unreported, so an estimate based on 
reported crime will be off by more than a factor of two. See John Gramlich, Most 
Violent and Property Crimes in the U.S. Go Unsolved, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/01/most-violent-and-property-crimes-
in-the-u-s-go-unsolved/ [https://perma.cc/B5DV-494H].  Any estimate of crime is 
noisy and rests on a host of methodological choices and assumptions, but the 
magnitude of the estimate is still an informative ballpark figure, though one whose 
uncertainty must always be kept in mind. 
 38. See TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE 
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT EXTRACTS, 2012–PRELIMINARY (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5239 [https://perma.cc/6QXJ-264K]. 
 39. See PFAFF, supra note 15, at 118–23. 
 40. Id. at 121. 
 41. Id. 
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has attempted to rigorously aggregate these costs, but they are no 
doubt vast. 
In short, the costs of crime and punishment are densely—and 
disproportionately—concentrated in cities (and within cities).  Voters, 
however, are distributed much differently.  Most Americans live in 
suburban or rural areas, not in cities, with a plurality in the suburbs.42  
Conventional studies of urbanization compare urban counties (such 
as Cook County, Illinois, the home of Chicago) to adjacent suburban 
counties (such as DeKalb County, Illinois), and find that there are 
about two suburbanites for every urbanite.43  Since the focus of this 
Essay is on prosecutors, who are elected within counties, what 
matters is the urban/suburban split within those urban counties.  
There is far less comprehensive data on this division, but in general, it 
suggests that the suburbs make up a significant share of urban county 
populations.  There are 472,000 people in Atlanta but over 1 million 
in Fulton County; only 250,000 people in Buffalo but nearly 1 million 
in Erie County; 377,000 in Tampa but 1.3 million in Hillsborough 
County; Los Angeles the city has a population of almost 4 million, but 
the county has over 10 million; and so forth.44 
Not only do suburbs often have higher population counts, but they 
seem likely to vote at higher rates as well, at least in urban areas.  
Data from the Census Bureau indicate that turnout is higher among 
voters who are white, older, and wealthier, all of which tend to 
describe residents of many near-urban suburbs.45  Criminal justice 
policies play a role here as well.  Not only do forty-eight states 
                                                                                                                                         
 42. Jed Kolko, How Suburban Are Big American Cities?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(May 21, 2015, 6:39 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-suburban-are-big-
american-cities/ [https://perma.cc/9ZP7-W7YH]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See generally U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/en.html 
[https://perma.cc/YSW3-MSZH].  Population data for Milwaukee, Minneapolis and 
Madison City from the U.S. Census Bureau, Public Data, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=kf7tgg1uo9ude_&met_y=population&
idim=place:5553000:5548000:2743000&hl=en&dl=en [https://perma.cc/G7JZ-ZYKR].  
There are, of course, certainly plenty of exceptions: Milwaukee the city, for example, 
has 595,000 people, which is more than half of Milwaukee the county’s 958,000 
people. Id. 
 45. Celia Llopis-Jepsen, Shawnee County Voter Turnout Varies Widely, Low-
Income Communities Have the Least Say, TOPEKA CAPITAL-J. (Jan. 21, 2017, 5:30 
PM), http://cjonline.com/news/state-government/2017-01-21/shawnee-county-voter-
turnout-varies-widely-low-income-communities [https://perma.cc/9E65-M3QA]. See 
generally THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHO VOTES? CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE: 1978–2014 (2015), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p20-
577.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JPM-5UD7]. 
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prevent those in prison from voting (an issue we will turn to again 
below), but over thirty deny the vote to those on probation or parole, 
and twelve restrict or ban voting even after parole has expired.46  
Given that minorities are over-represented in the criminal justice 
system(s), they will be over-represented among those whose votes are 
restricted.47  And even when not formally excluded from voting, areas 
with more minority voters often face larger practical hurdles for 
voting, and these hurdles have only grown worse in places where 
protections under the Voting Rights Act were weakened following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder.48 
The story within cities is somewhat more complicated, but still 
shares important parallels with the broader urban/suburban one.  On 
the one hand, we should see the suburban story replicated to some 
extent, albeit perhaps to a lesser degree.  Crime is not only 
concentrated within cities as compared to suburbs, but even within 
neighborhoods in those cities.49  The safer neighborhoods will be 
wealthier and whiter, and more likely to have higher voter turnout 
rates.50  Like their suburban counterparts, these safer urbanites will 
view crime and punishment more as abstractions than lived 
experiences.  On the other hand, urban residents tend to be more 
liberal than those in the suburbs, and they are more likely to have at 
least some contact with people exposed to the criminal justice system, 
which may—may—make them more sensitive to the costs of 
enforcement. 
                                                                                                                                         
 46. Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the United States, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-
disenfranchisement-laws-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/9Q2B-FE22]. 
 47. The impact of felony disenfranchisements laws is unclear.  Some have argued 
it plays an important role, especially in close elections. See, e.g., Christopher Uggen 
& Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of Felon 
Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 778 (2002).  Thomas 
J. Miles, however, has suggested that this effect could be overstated. Thomas J. Miles, 
Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 85, 85 (2004). 
 48. 570 U.S. 2 (2013).  For the impact of Shelby County, see Election 2016: 
Restrictive Voting Laws by the Numbers, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Sept. 28, 
2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2016-restrictive-voting-laws-
numbers [https://perma.cc/Q2M4-89QR]. See generally Daniel Weeks, Why Are the 
Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-the-poor-and-
minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/ [https://perma.cc/D9K9-8FT2]. 
 49. See David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City: The United States Is Coming to 
Resemble Two Countries, One Rural and One Urban. What Happens When They 
Go to War?, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857/ [https://perma.cc/XE8M-638F]. 
 50. See id. 
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Taken together, these competing distributions of crime and 
punishment on the one hand, and voting power on the other, strongly 
suggest that those with the most political power when it comes to 
electing the prosecutor will be those least exposed to the costs of that 
prosecutor’s enforcement decisions.  This account can help explain 
the two trends we noted at the start of this section.  When crime 
started to rise in the 1960s, suburbanites were relatively indifferent, 
since they were not really experiencing the harms—and as Figure 1 
indicates, prosecutorial behavior appears to have reflected that.  
After the urban riots in the 1960s and 1970s, suburbanites and white 
urbanites began to fear crime more, and likely began to fear urban 
social disorder more generally—less because of the direct physical 
threat it posed to them and more because it stoked racial fears and 
resentments.51  And so suburban voters cracked down.52  But the 
demand for prosecutorial punitiveness did not stop when the crime 
rate started to fall, since those with political power appreciated the 
sense of safety (and perhaps benefited from it as they moved back to 
city), but they still did not bear the costs of excessive or inefficient 
punishment.53 
In other words, prosecutorial reactions to crime are not driven 
(entirely) by the crime rate, but rather by how that crime rate shapes 
the attitudes of those voters least exposed to it.  Right now, those 
attitudes appear to lead to excessive punitiveness, but in the past they 
also appear to have contributed to excessive indifference.  Both cases 
highlight the problem of separating the costs and benefits of a 
program from those who decide what the program should look like.  
Furthermore, while there exists very little research on this issue, this 
geographic split between political power and the experience of crime 
and punishment may explain some other irregularities we see in 
criminal justice outcomes.  For example, some critics of current 
policies argue that our priorities are often misplaced, pointing out 
that we made over 1.5 million arrests for drug offenses and over 1 
million arrests for various vice crimes, even while more than one-third 
of all murders resulted in no arrest (and, if past data are any 
indication, perhaps as many as two-thirds of all murders of Black 
                                                                                                                                         
 51. For a discussion on the impact of urban riots in places such as Detroit and 
their impact on white America’s views on criminal justice, see STUNTZ, supra note 29, 
at 35. 
 52. See id.  
 53. To be clear, I am not proposing geography as some sort of mono-causal theory 
here.  Other factors surely explain toughness and leniency.  Geography, however, is a 
key factor that either helped drive the trends or at least enabled the other forces 
shaping them to push things more dramatically. 
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men).54  Some of the emphasis on drug and vice crimes may be 
justifiable—some argue that low-level arrests are important ways to 
gather information to clear serious crimes like homicide and rape55—
but the geographic story I describe above suggests that at least some 
of the focus on drugs and vice is excessive.  I suspect that this 
discrepancy exists because those in safer urban and suburban 
neighborhoods can envision drug and vice crimes as ones which might 
affect them or their families.  Their children are unlikely to be killed, 
but they could be exposed to drugs.  So they have an incentive to push 
law enforcement and prosecutors to target crimes such as drug 
trafficking. 
The policy recommendation that immediately flows from this is 
that we should not elect prosecutors at the county level, but at a more 
local level.  At the very least, perhaps we should have two elected 
offices in urban counties: one for the city and another for the non-city 
parts.  So rather than a Cook County office or an Erie County office, 
we would have a Chicago office and non-Chicago Cook County 
office, or a Buffalo Office and a non-Buffalo Erie County office.  It 
may not be necessary for every ring suburb to have its own separate 
prosecutor’s office—there are surely some efficiencies of scale we 
should take into account—but an urban-suburban split deserves far 
more attention than it gets. 
To be clear, such a split does not automatically mean that city 
prosecutors would immediately become less punitive (although given 
that more-progressive prosecutors won numerous elections in 2016, 
that would likely be the case at this particular moment in time).56  In 
                                                                                                                                         
 54. 2016 Crime in the United States: Estimated Number of Arrests, FBI: UCR, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/topic-pages/tables/
table-18 [https://perma.cc/GGR3-VW3Y]; 2016 Crime in the United States: 
Clearances, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/
topic-pages/clearances [https://perma.cc/NX7L-ANL4].  For the clearance rates for 
Black male victims, see generally, JILL LEOVY, GHETTOSIDE: A TRUE STORY OF 
MURDER IN AMERICA (2015). 
 55. See, e.g., Peter Moskos (@PeterMoskos), TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2017, 11:19 
AM), https://twitter.com/PeterMoskos/status/913105759453552652 [https://perma.cc/
7UZ4-JWA7]; @deputybarksdale, TWITTER (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:01 PM), 
https://twitter.com/deputybarksdale/status/913116354722582528 [https://perma.cc/
38LX-VHM3] (Twitter conversation between the author and former law 
enforcement officers who offer anecdotal support for this assertion). 
 56. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & Whitney Tymas, Election Night Saw Victories in 
Local Criminal-Justice Reform—This Should Be the Beginning, THE NATION (Nov. 
12, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/election-night-saw-victories-in-local-
criminal-justice-reform-this-should-be-the-beginning [https://perma.cc/CUZ4-Q5N3] 
(describing how progressive candidates won local prosecutor races in November 
2016). 
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fact, they could end up being harsher in many cases—but that could 
be a good thing.  We want prosecutors to respond to changing 
conditions, including cracking down as crime rises, something we did 
not see happen in the 1960s and early 1970s.  Ideally, however, more-
local prosecutors would respond to these increases in smarter ways 
than they did in the past, and in ways that better reflect the policy 
preferences of urban constituents.  I also expect that they would be 
more likely to rein in their punitiveness faster were crime rates to 
decline. 
A slightly more modest approach—one that does not require any 
jurisdictional shakeups and has already been implemented to at least 
some degree in several counties—is “community prosecution,” which 
emphasizes the need for district attorneys’ offices to take local 
community concerns into account.57  Jurisdictions that embrace this 
idea establish satellite offices in neighborhoods throughout the 
county so that assistant prosecutors have better contact with those 
communities and thus respond more readily to their shifting 
concerns.58  The elected prosecutor at the top is still chosen by an 
electorate over-represented by suburbanites, but the more-local 
offices are likely an improvement over traditional, more-centralized 
approaches.59 
There is a growing appreciation for the power of prosecutors and 
their impact on incarceration rates and on punishment rates more 
broadly—and thus a growing awareness that reforms need to focus on 
regulating their behavior.  A key part of understanding who 
prosecutors are and what they do, however, is understanding where 
they are, and what that means about the incentives that they face. 
Before moving on, a brief but important point: while I have 
focused here on the views of those least affected by crime and 
punishment—since they have the largest political voice—I do not 
want to silence those who are most affected but have the weaker say 
                                                                                                                                         
 57. See, e.g., JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 
COMMUNITY PROSECUTION STRATEGIES: MEASURING IMPACT 1 (2002), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/192826.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X6P-FAC6]. 
 58. Id. at 5–6. 
 59. There are few empirical assessments of community prosecution.  One of the 
few argues that it seems to effectively reduce some crimes with little to no downside. 
See Thomas J. Miles, Does the “Community Prosecution” Strategy Reduce Crime? 
A Test of Chicago’s Experience, 16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 117, 117 (2013).  Note, 
though, that the only metric of success that Miles looks at is “reduced crime.”  While 
this metric is important, there are surely other margins that concern us as well.  If 
community prosecution has no clear impact on crime but improves the public’s view 
of the criminal justice system or makes people feel more acknowledged by a major 
government agency, then community prosecution may still be quite justifiable. 
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in elections.  It is easy to tell a story in which the criminal justice 
system consists of white suburban and urban voters imposing a 
repressive regime on Black citizens who lack any political clout to 
resist.  And there is certainly some validity to this claim.  Yet the 
views of those who live in poorer, higher-crime communities are 
complex and deserve our attention.  Several recent studies, for 
example, have shown that Black elites in these communities have 
often pushed for tough-on-crime laws when crime rates are rising, 
since it is their communities that have borne the brunt of those 
harms.60  The attitudes of those in high-crime areas, however, are 
frequently far more pragmatic than those who live elsewhere: tougher 
when crime goes up, but less tough as crime goes down, with a greater 
emphasis on what actually works rather than what is symbolically 
satisfying.61  Any full accounting of the politics of punishment thus 
needs to also account for both the political resistance and support that 
arises in black communities. 
II.  PRISONS AND THE CENSUS 
Another way in which geography shapes the politics of punishment 
is through the physical location of prisons.  Not surprisingly, the surge 
in prisoners in the United States led to a simultaneous boom in prison 
construction, and between 1970 and 2010, state and federal agencies 
                                                                                                                                         
 60. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017); MICHAEL J. 
FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY (2015). But see Vesla M. Weaver, The Untold 
Story of Mass Incarceration, BOS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), http://bostonreview.net/race-
law-justice/vesla-m-weaver-untold-story-mass-incarceration [https://perma.cc/LFR3-
7HVP]. 
 61. On racial differences in pragmatic versus expressive views of punishment, see 
generally Steven F. Cohn et al., Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminals: Racial 
Consensus or Racial Conflict, 38 SOC. PROBS. 287 (1991).  A 2016 survey of crime 
victims by the Alliance for Safety and Justice revealed this more pragmatic take 
clearly.  The report demonstrated that victims tend to hold views that are less 
punitive than the public as a whole, and less punitive than what our policies look like.  
The reason for this quickly becomes clear.  The survey’s sample is disproportionately 
young and minority—because crime victims tend to be young and minority.  Given 
both their greater exposure to the harms of overly-aggressive enforcement and their 
greater understanding of blurry lines between “offender” and “victim” (people fall 
into both categories far more often than our simple narratives suggest), they are less 
likely to emphasize punitive responses to crime and more likely to favor “restorative 
justice” approaches that aim to reintegrate the people guilty of the crime while still 
taking accountability for the harms they caused. See ALL. FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, 
CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRST-EVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS 
ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 4–5 (2016), https://www.allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Survivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YV5T-BC3W]. 
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built over 1100 new prisons.62  These prisons had to be sited 
somewhere, and in the end they were frequently located away from 
urban centers; nearly 70% of prisons are now in non-metropolitan 
towns.63 
This geographic choice has certainly not gone unnoticed, although 
most of the scholarship has focused on the impact of prisons on the 
economic health of these rural communities.64  There has also been 
some analysis of the impact of rural prison siting on prisoners and 
their families, given that crimes (and thus prisoners) are 
disproportionately concentrated in urban areas.  In the New York 
State system, for example, about 45% of all people sent to prison in 
2016 were from New York City65—yet over half the state’s maximum 
security prisons are at least 200 miles away from New York City, and 
there have been no state prisons located in New York City itself since 
the Arthur Kill facility on Staten Island was closed in 2011.66  In 2004 
(the last year with data), about two-thirds of all prisoners nationwide 
were housed more than 101 miles away from home, with over 10% 
more than 500 miles away.67  Such distance imposes real emotional 
costs on inmates and their families: it impedes visits, it forces families 
to rely more on expensive collect calls, and it creates other significant 
financial costs, such as the resources needed to go visit loved ones in 
far-flung prisons (bus fare, hotel rooms, lost wages, etc.).68  There is 
                                                                                                                                         
 62. John M. Eason, Prisons as Panacea or Pariah? The Countervailing 
Consequences of the Prison Boom on the Political Economy of Rural Towns, 6 SOC. 
SCI. 7, 7–8 (2017) (surveying prison boom in rural communities). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  The general finding in this literature is that the impact of prisons is slight 
at best, if not moderately harmful, although Eason’s work suggests that these results 
may be too pessimistic once we account for selection bias; the towns that seek out 
prisons are ones that are already suffering more than others, and so prisons may not 
make things improve, but they could slow or stop the decline already underway. Id. 
 65. 2012–2016 Dispositions of Adult Arrests, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/G2XQ-DAS3]. 
 66. Post Staff Report, SI’s Arthur Kill Correctional Facility Closed, Six Others 
Shuttered, N.Y. POST (Jan. 3, 2012, 2:26 PM), http://nypost.com/2012/01/03/sis-arthur-
kill-correctional-facility-closed-six-others-shuttered [https://perma.cc/K4CR-TPLM]; 
Facilities Overview, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/
facilities.page [https://perma.cc/GZ4Q-J7HP] (providing an overview of state penal 
facilities in New York City, with none having been constructed since the Arthur Kill 
facility closed). 
 67. See Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Koph, Separation by Bars and Miles: 
Visitation in State Prisons, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 20, 2015), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/prisonvisits.html [https://perma.cc/7EHW-SP92]. 
 68. See generally Meghan M. Mitchell et al., The Effect of Prison Visitation on 
Reentry Success: A Meta-Analysis, 47 J. CRIM. JUST. 74 (2016). 
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also some mixed evidence that making visits more difficult weakens 
family ties in ways that lead to a greater risk of recidivism upon 
release.69 
In this Essay, however, I want to examine how the decisions about 
where to locate prisons shape the politics of punishment in general 
and of prison reform more specifically.  In particular, it is important 
to understand how prison siting and Census Bureau policies interact 
to create a powerful group opposed to reducting prison populations: 
rural legislators.  Legislators with prisons in their districts already 
have an incentive to resist closures because of the perceived economic 
benefits; the Census issue only strengthens that resistance, in 
important but often underappreciated ways. 
The key issue is this: for the purposes of Census enumeration, 
where does a prisoner “reside”?  Does he live in the prison?  Or does 
he live at his last known address prior to incarceration?  The Census 
relies on the “usual residence” rule—where the person “lives and 
sleeps most of the time”—which for incarcerated people that means 
the facilities in which they are serving their time.70  And forty-six 
states (all but California, Delaware, Maryland and New York) choose 
to follow the Census rule: incarcerated people “live” in their 
prisons.71  As a result, having prisons filled to capacity may not just be 
an issue of economic gain for rural legislators, but one of political 
survival. 
There are two intertwined effects at play.  The first, and most 
obvious, is one of apportionment.  When states are drawing the lines 
for local, state, and federal election districts, they are required to 
ensure that all districts have roughly the same number of people.72  
Counting prisoners as “residing” in their prison cells (even though 
many state codes and constitutions explicitly state that prison cells 
                                                                                                                                         
 69. The effect is not as clear as a quick look at the data suggests; it is hard to 
separate the extent to which family visits reduce the risk of re-arrest or readmission 
from the fact that those least likely to recidivate in the first place probably have 
stronger family ties and thus more visits. Id. 
 70. RESIDENCE RULE AND RESIDENCE SITUATIONS FOR THE 2010 CENSUS, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/resid_rules/resid_
rules.html [https://perma.cc/4QLM-AQWL]. 
 71. Note that in California and Delaware the move away from the Census rule 
does not take effect until after the 2020 Census. See Prison Gerrymandering Project, 
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org [https://perma.cc/
N7EX-AZ4G]. 
 72. See, e.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842–44 (1983). 
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cannot be considered “residences”73) shifts representation from 
more-urban areas (where crime is concentrated) to more-rural ones 
(where prisons are often located). 
In more-local elections, this sort of “prison gerrymandering” can 
have outsized effects.  In perhaps the most infamous case, one 
municipal district in Anamosa, Iowa, consisted of 58 real, voting 
residents, compared to nearly 1400 in all other districts, because the 
rest of its population was incarcerated in the local jail (and therefore 
unable to vote); that district’s representative won his election with 
exactly two votes.74  In Wyoming, two state senate districts were 
redrawn to shift a state prison from one district to the other to ensure 
that two incumbents did not have to challenge each other in the wake 
of redistricting.75  More broadly, in Pennsylvania eight districts drawn 
subsequent to the 2000 Census would not have met equal-vote 
requirements were it not for their prisons,76 and when New York 
State abolished prison gerrymandering, Republican legislators 
successfully pushed to add a seat to the senate—an effort to offset 
their expected losses from the resulting redistricting that favored 
more-liberal New York City.77 
As touched upon earlier, there is a second, even more pernicious 
impact from counting prisoners as “residing” where they are 
incarcerated.  In all but two of the forty-six states that “prison 
gerrymander” (the exceptions being Maine and Vermont), people 
incarcerated in prisons cannot vote while behind bars.78  This turns a 
                                                                                                                                         
 73. See Peter Wagner et al., Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010 
Census: A 50 State Guide, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states [https://perma.cc/32Q8-BWAY]. 
 74. Anamosa has since fixed this problem. See Prison-Based Gerrymandering in 
Iowa, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 8, 2010), https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/
factsheets/ia/iowa.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5NF-V5YK]. 
 75. See Peter Wagner, Intentional Prison-Based Gerrymandering Found in 
Wyoming, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 4, 2012), 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2012/03/04/wyoming [https://perma.cc/
8UWY-RTUM]. 
 76. See Fixing Prison-Based Gerrymandering After the 2010 Census: 
Pennsylvania, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010), 
https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/50states/PA.html [https://perma.cc/VS6W-
KKGT]. 
 77. See Sasha Chavkin & Michael Keller, GOP Wants New Senate Seat, N.Y. 
WORLD (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/gop-wants-new-
senate-seat/article_8ce4df3c-7eb3-5b21-8ce2-b53fc1bbe2ae.html [https://perma.cc/2Y
W8-ACHJ]. 
 78. See LALEH ISPAHANI & TRICIA FORBES, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION & RIGHT 
TO VOTE, VOTING WHILE INCARCERATED: A TOOL KIT FOR ADVOCATES SEEKING TO 
REGISTER, AND FACILITATE VOTING BY, ELIGIBLE PEOPLE IN JAIL, at iii (2005), 
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geographic distortion into a partisan one.  In 2015, approximately 
35% of prisoners were Black and 22% were Hispanic; only 34% were 
white (with approximately 9% other races).79  Both Black and 
Hispanic individuals are disproportionately likely to vote for 
Democratic candidates: one study by the Pew Research Center in 
2014 reported that 80% of Black citizens and 56% of Hispanic citizens 
identified as Democrats and Democratic-leaning.80  Yet rural 
counties—where prisons tend to be located—are generally 
conservative and have grown increasingly so.81 
In other words, prisons shift Democratic-leaning voters to more-
Republican districts where they count for representation but cannot 
vote.  Even if those who engage in criminal behavior are less likely to 
vote in the first place (perhaps because of age, poverty, or other 
personal traits),82 shifting their residency to more-rural areas weakens 
the political power of the communities from which they come, which 
(like the prisoners themselves) are disproportionately Democratic-
leaning.83 
To drive the point home bluntly: prison gerrymandering is, in a 




 79. See E. Ann Carson & Elizabeth Anderson, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Prisoners in 2015, BULL. NO. NCJ 250229, Dec. 2016, at 13 tbl.8, 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG49-FJTN].  
“Hispanic,” of course, is not a race, but an ethnicity.  Here, “white” refers to “white, 
non-Hispanic” and Black to “black, non-Hispanic.”  Thus “Hispanic” includes both 
Blacks and whites. 
 80. See A Deep Dive into Party Affiliation: Sharp Difference by Race, Gender, 
Generation, Education, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.people-
press.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-affiliation [https://perma.cc/MWV7-
WAT2].  Furthermore, even though whites tend to lean Republican, poorer whites 
have generally been less likely to be Republican than richer whites. See generally 
Razib Khan, The Upper Class Is More Republican, DISCOVER MAG.: BLOG (Mar. 25, 
2012, 3:31 PM), http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2012/03/the-upper-class-is-
more-republican/ [https://perma.cc/Y7M7-K95R].  To the extent that prisoners, 
including white inmates, come from poorer communities, the white voters in prison 
are likely disproportionately Democratic compared to whites outside of prison. 
 81. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural America Are Becoming Increasingly 
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing [https://perma.cc/Q9UM-Y2CW]. 
 82. See, e.g., Miles, supra note 47, at 115 (suggesting that disenfranchisement laws 
have little electoral effect because of the seeming pre-disenfranchisement voting 
behavior of the disenfranchised). 
 83. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 49. 
 84. The Three-Fifths Compromise in the U.S. Constitution counted slaves in 
slave-owning states as three-fifths of a person for enumeration purposes. Leah 
Sakala, Prison-Based Gerrymandering’s Striking Resemblance to the Infamous 
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The impact of prison gerrymandering on prison reform is clear: it 
creates a strong constituency that is opposed to reform because their 
very jobs depend on keeping the prisons near them full.  Politicians in 
prison districts care about the economic benefits of prisons, but that is 
an issue more of staffing than of prisoners: a half-empty prison with a 
full staff of guards is just as economically beneficial as that prison 
with the same number of guards, but more prisoners.85  The way the 
Census data is used for district apportionment, however, forces those 
politicians to care about the number of prisoners, and thus makes 
them resistant to all but the most tepid of reforms. 
Eliminating prison gerrymandering will be tricky.  Look back at the 
four states that have replaced it: California, Delaware, Maryland, and 
New York.  A common trait is that all four are solidly Democratic 
states; in fact, when each passed its law reversing prison 
gerrymandering, the Democrats controlled both chambers of the 
legislature and the governor’s mansion.86  Such a “trifecta” is likely 
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 85. States are often quite adept at cutting prison populations while keeping 
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Despite Fewer Inmates, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://citylimits.org/2015/11/10/
nys-prison-budget-climbs-despite-fewer-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/7TPG-DC6G]; see 
also PFAFF, supra note 15, at 98–104. 
 86. See California State Assembly Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), 
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Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_House_of_
Delegates_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/DM4J-6XZT] (Maryland passed its law 
in 2010); Maryland State Senate Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), 
https://ballotpedia.org/Maryland_State_Senate_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/
SAD2-7CBK] (Maryland’s governor at the time was Democrat Martin O’Malley); 
New York State Assembly Elections, 2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), 
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_State_Assembly_elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/
Q427-A6UF] (New York passed its law in 2010); New York State Senate Elections, 
2010, BALLOTPEDIA (2010), https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_State_Senate_
elections,_2010 [https://perma.cc/FRY4-FVZ8] (New York’s governor was Democrat 
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essential for any law to repeal prison gerrymandering, given the 
explicitly Republican-leaning partisan impact of counting people from 
cities as non-voting rural residents. 
That political reality suggests that state-level reforms of prison 
gerrymandering will be rare these days.  As of 2017, only six states 
have Democratic trifectas, and two of those are California and 
Delaware.87  It only takes one Republican institution to block a 
reform bill, especially if the legislature cannot override a veto.  There 
was a push in 2016 to get the U.S. Census Bureau to reform its policy 
and count prisoners as “residing” where they had lived prior to their 
incarceration,88 but as of now Census has not acted on the proposal, 
and given the general chaos engulfing that agency right now, any sort 
of action would be surprising, even before accounting for likely 
partisan resistance.89  But had the Census Bureau decided to change 
the rule (and to be clear, its preferred position entering discussions 
was to keep counting prisoners as residing in prisons), it is likely that 
few, if any, states or local communities would have taken steps to re-
gerrymander their counts.  This is one area where the federal 
government could have had a major, almost instantaneous impact on 
criminal justice policy.  That, however, seems unlikely to happen right 
now. 
Yet there is some potential for reform, at least at the local level.  
Even if the federal and state governments refuse to change their 
districting laws, local governments remain free to avoid 
gerrymandering for local seats—and hundreds of counties and cities 
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have done just that.90  And the fact is that gerrymandering will have 
its biggest impact at the smaller, more-local levels.  A New York State 
Assembly district has nearly 130,000 people in it, and a state senate 
seat almost 315,000.91  The largest prisons in New York hold 
approximately 2000 to 3000 prisoners each day,92 so the overall 
impact is not that large (although, eliminating prison gerrymandering 
statewide likely resulted in shifting partisan control of at least one 
Senate seat overall).  For elections in prison towns, however, 2000 to 
3000 inmates would have a far bigger impact—though, of course, 
those municipal representatives are not setting major criminal-justice 
policies.93 
CONCLUSION 
The criminal justice system is not a single coherent “system,” but 
rather a somewhat—or sometimes extremely—chaotic collection of 
agencies, each responding to a unique set of incentives.94  And these 
incentives are, quite frequently, strongly shaped by who the 
constituents are, which is determined by where the constituents are.95  
The two examples above highlight the need to account for place, and 
how thinking about where these agencies are helps us better 
understand what they are going to do, and thus what sorts of reforms 
we may need to enact.96  These are, of course, not the only examples 
of place’s role in shaping punishment: one effort to abolish plea 
bargaining famously failed because the city police refused to make 
the changes that the county prosecutors asked of them,97 and the slow 
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decline in prison populations we have seen since 2010 has not been 
the result of states decarcerating, but of urban counties in those states 
decarcerating even as rural counties in the same states continued to 
become more punitive.98  The examples here, however, do 
demonstrate the importance of thinking carefully about where 
criminal justice actors are when deciding what reforms to adopt. 
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